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504. The International Commission of Jurists and the Berlin Wall

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Background: The International Commission of Jurists is, in its own words "a non-governmental organization which has Consultative Status, Category 'B', with the United Nations Economic and Social Council. The Commission seeks to foster understanding of and respect for the Rule of Law." Its membership embraces distinguished jurists, lawyers and scholars of the law drawn from all parts of the world. It has been active in studying and publicizing cases where human rights have been violated, where the Rule of Law has been ignored and where dictatorial or totalitarian practices have invaded or denied individual rights and freedoms. Its report on the Tibetan takeover, on Apartheid in South Africa and on the Hungarian rebellion have received wide circulation and been highly acclaimed. On 7 March 1962, the ICJ released in Geneva a pamphlet entitled "The Berlin Wall - A Defiance of Human Rights." This little pamphlet is a concise and factual study of the legal and juridical aspects of the walling off of East Berlin from West Berlin, well documented by reference to and citations of applicable laws, ordinances, treaties, etc. For example, the document points out that freedom to emigrate is guaranteed under the Constitution of the German Democratic Republic (p. 44).

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9 April 1962

505. Khrushchev Fails to Solve Soviet Agricultural Problems

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**Background:** The CPSU Central Committee plenary session, which began on 5 March 1962, ended on 9 March with the persistent problem of agriculture having occupied, as expected, the attention of the conference to the apparent exclusion of everything else. If there were any discussions of other matters they were not published. In two lengthy speeches at the beginning and end of the session, Khrushchev claimed that there was no insoluble problem in Soviet agriculture but it was clear enough from what he said and what was decided at the session that this chronic problem was exactly what the session was all about. Khrushchev compared the strength of Soviet industry with the unending weakness of its agriculture. He admitted that food production in general was nowhere near fulfilling its Plan and, in particular, that "in certain towns there has been an interruption of the supply of meat; the population has had to go through certain difficulties." But there was no sign of the radical measures for which the situation plainly calls. Instead of asking how the system could be adapted to meet the demands of reality, he brought forward two more panaceas, neither of which was, at most, more than an expedient or shift of a highly dubious kind: the abandonment of ley farming (intercropping with fodder crops instead of grasses - ~~SECRET~~); and a brand-new apparatus called the ~~SECRET~~ production management unit for centralized management and control. Once again, Mr. Khrushchev has evaded the subject of private property - a vital matter which was not mentioned by anybody present at the plenum - and, as usual, substituted additional doses of Communist bureaucracy. Khrushchev ignores the fact that the Soviet farmer was doing well enough before collectivization; he ignores the fact that a Communist farmer (or any other) will produce more if he is allowed to do so for himself and his family, instead of for a doctrine he is compelled to believe or to work for even if he doesn't. Nobody can expect the USSR to equal more temperate countries in yield per acre or in per capita production of meat, milk or eggs. It was not lack of moisture which caused the catastrophic fall in production in the terrible days of collectivization under Stalin - and it has not been lack of moisture which has ruined the agriculture of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany or Communist China. Agriculture has been doing fairly well (for a non-free country) in only one Communist state: Poland. And in Poland the farmers have rejected collectivization - or in effect, communism in agriculture. The Plenum condemned as a scientific failure the grass rotation system under which a sizeable section (perhaps a quarter) of Soviet farm land was in low-yielding hayfields and asked for wider planting of more productive feed crops such as corn, sugar beets, peas and beans. The plenum also called for the organization of a dual system of regional agricultural management

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consisting of collective and state farms and agriculture coordinating committees headed by first Secretaries of the regional Party organization (i.e. the production management units). In short, they substituted more Party controls and more coordinating committees instead of doing what was really needed: giving the farmer more capital, more fertilizer and, above all, setting him free. But, understandably, they couldn't or wouldn't do that: while no doubt it would lead to the solution of their agricultural problems it would also mean the end of the Communist system.

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506. Communist China Undergoes Surgery with "Criticism and Self-Criticism"

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Background:

a. General All of our propaganda directed toward Communist targets seeks to exploit, and in some cases create, a vulnerability in the target audience. A clear indication that a vulnerability does in fact exist is when the Communists identify a situation as requiring "criticism and self-criticism." The Communist propagandists frequently perform this very useful service (identifying vulnerabilities) for us, but their doctrine denies that there are more disadvantages than advantages in revealing their mistakes and errors to the "enemy." During the past six months in Communist China there has been a concerted effort to strengthen party unity, exact greater cadre discipline, and instill greater revolutionary zeal among the masses by pointing to the need to undertake "criticism and self-criticism." It is the function of this guidance to highlight the theoretical base of the slogan "criticism and self-criticism," point to its strengths and weaknesses from the anti-Communist propagandist's point of view, and establish guidelines for the exploitation of this dialectic as a panacea for all Communist problems.

b. Doctrinal Base. As might be expected, Marx first said it. In his Eighteenth Brumaire (1852) he writes:

"Bourgeois revolutions, like those of the eighteenth century, storm swiftly from success to success...but they are short lived. On the otherhand, proletarian revolutions, like those of the nineteenth century, criticize themselves constantly, interrupt themselves continually in their own course, come back to the apparently accomplished in order to begin it afresh, and deride with unmerciful thoroughness the inadequacy, weakness and paltriness of their first attempts."

Lenin's writings, while making it clear that "we should not conceal our mistakes from the enemy" laid down certain conditions. As Carew Hunt in his GUIDE TO COMMUNIST JARGON explains: Lenin's conditions were that "criticism must be submitted for discussion to the Party as a whole and not to groups." As Carew Hunt observes, "unwelcome criticism can easily be dismissed as destructive or by implication an attack on the ideological base of the Communist order which lies outside the field of criticism altogether." He is undoubtedly drawing on Lenin's "Preliminary Draft of Resolution on Party Unity" (1921):

"Everyone who criticizes must see to it that the form of his criticism takes into account the position the Party occupies in a ring of enemies, and the contents of his criticism must be of the nature of direct participation in Soviet and Party work...the study of methods of rectifying errors, etc., must under no circumstances be submitted for preliminary

NOTE: For this and other supporting quotes see Soviet World Outlook, A Handbook of Communist Statements, Department of State (1959) pushed to all Stations.

Stalin in his SHORT HISTORY OF THE CPSU wrote: "A party is invincible if it does not fear criticism and self-criticism." The WORKS OF J.V. STALIN, Vol II (1928-1929) reveals that Stalin too placed conditions on "self-criticism."

"It would be strange to fear that our enemies, our internal and external enemies, might exploit the criticism of our shortcomings and raise the shout: Oho! All is not well with those Bolsheviks! ... What do we expect from the slogan of self-criticism, what results can it yield if it is carried out properly and honestly? ... It should sharpen the vigilance of the working class, make it pay more attention to our shortcomings, facilitate their correction and render impossible any kind of 'surprises.' ... But there is another kind of self-criticism, one that tends to destroy the party spirit, to discredit the Soviet regime, to weaken our work of construction, to corrupt our economic cadres, to disarm the working class and to foster talk of degeneration... It goes without saying that the Party will combat such 'self-criticism' with might and main."

It was Mao Tse-tung who utilized and expanded upon the doctrine of criticism and self-criticism more than any other Communist theoretician. During the course of the Party Reform Movement (1942-1943) he pointed to the need to "wash the brains" of those whose ways of thinking were judged inimical or unhealthy for his New Democracy. Self-criticism became the main crutch of the "brain washing." Its tactical importance as a means of smoking out the opposition and consolidating power was emphasized again in 1956 with the beginning of the "blooming and contending period." On 26 May 1956 Mao's Director of Propaganda stated: "The Chinese Communist Party advocates one hundred flowers bloom for literary works and one hundred schools contend in the scientific field... to promote the freedom of independent thinking, freedom of debate, freedom of creation and criticism...." As originally conceived the program was intended for writers, artists, and scientists, but with the news of the Hungarian Revolution, the program was rapidly expanded to include all spectrums of party and cadre life with hope of bringing discontent to the surface and avoiding any surprise mass demonstrations. This period of open criticism was brought to an abrupt end in June 1957 when a wave of anticommunism swept the Mainland and was dramatized by the Hanyang student uprising during which more than a thousand students wrecked Party and State offices and demanded Mao's resignation. Hundreds of intellectuals were imprisoned or executed and some 20,000 others were demoted or subjected to "reform through labor." In brief those who had dared "blossom" or "contend" were branded extreme rightists or counter-revolutionaries.

In the midst of Mao's experiment with "blooming and contending" he felt compelled to add a new ideological twist to the proper conduct of criticism. On 27 February 1957 he made a speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People." After stating: "Our party is devoted to the interest of the people and is the servant of the people," he admitted:

"But even between this government and the people at large there are contradictions, including those between national and collective interests and individual interests, between democracy and centralism, between leaders and the guided, and between some Government-agency members with their bureaucratic ways and the public... In ordinary cases, contradictions among the people do not involve antagonism, but if they are improperly handled, or if we are careless about them, they may turn into hostility."

It is important to note here that Maoism holds that non-antagonistic contradiction, i.e. those other than contradiction with capitalists, can be eliminated by the weapon of "unity-criticism-unity" which is a much more cautious form of "criticism and self-criticism" since it demands that criticism be undertaken only in cases where the disputants guarantee that the criticism will yield greater unity. (See subparagraph C below for a recent People's Daily article on this.)

As is well known, Khrushchev has leaned heavily on "criticism and self-criticism," particularly with regard to his attacks on the "cult of the personality" and in the field of agriculture. He has not, however, added to the doctrine itself. On numerous occasions he has reminded the Soviet people that they have nothing to fear from energetic criticism, held that such "looking at truth squarely in the face" is unique to the Marxist-Leninist Party, but he too imposes conditions. "When we criticize the shortcomings and errors that have been permitted in our forward march, we must above all be sure that this criticism strengthens the Soviet system and helps us to advance even more rapidly and successfully toward our great aim, communism." (Pravda, April 13, 1956). The recently adopted program of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU stated that one of the Party's tasks was "To develop criticism and self-criticism to the utmost as a tried and tested method of work and a means of disclosing and rectifying errors and shortcomings and the proper education of cadres."

While criticism, with all its self-imposed restrictions, is a phenomenon which transcends all aspects of Communist life, it is usually only in times of urgency (declining morale, lagging production, internal party strife) that a situation is clearly isolated in Communist propaganda as demanding "criticism and self-criticism" therapy. Communist China is today in a veritable orgy of criticism.

c. Communist Chinese Increased Attention to "Criticism and Self-Criticism" Since about the first of the year there has been a noticeable increase in Chinese domestic propaganda on the subject, but as if to avoid the mistakes of too much criticism which might challenge the authority of the Party itself, there has been careful attention to the correct handling of criticism. Thus in an atmosphere of continued economic crisis, lagging food production and an admitted decline of "peoples morale and revolutionary zeal among the cadre," the CCP has launched a campaign to stimulate correct "criticism and self-criticism." For example a Peking People's Daily article of 10 January 1962 stated:



"To correctly implement the policy of 'unity-criticism-unity' we, in the process of handling the inner party ideological struggles, must make objectives clear and use suitable methods. By making objectives clear, we mean that we must clearly understand that the objective of criticism is to educate comrades and strengthen unity. . . . The aspiration for solidarity is the starting off point for carrying out ideological struggles within the party. Without this starting off point we would be unable to help comrades who have erred to correct their errors. Every contradiction within the party must be resolved through struggles (criticism and self-criticism)."

The above suggests that criticism will be most unwelcome unless there is the initial "aspiration for solidarity" i.e. desire to follow party leadership and direction. On the following day People's Daily recounted the experiences of the Party Branch of the Yung-ch'ing Production Brigade, Hua-yang Commune, Shensi Province. The article noted that twenty-eight members of the Party Branch were less than 30 years old and there had been "shortcomings in their ideological understanding, work styles and methods of work." Biweekly meetings are held at which "the weapon of criticism and self-criticism is applied to strengthen the party spirit of party members." "The experiences of this Party Branch serve to show that in order to launch criticism and self-criticism correctly, it is necessary to grasp regularly the state of thinking of the party members, to find out the ideological roots of the shortcomings and conduct criticism in relation to reality." (NOTE: "Reality" used in this context means Party line.) Any doubts about this are quickly dispelled in a Radio Peking domestic broadcast of 5 March:

"The personal interests of party members and the interests of the party are actually 'the unity of opposites.' In order to understand this one must recognize the existence of a contradiction and in the meantime also recognize the 'unity.' In handling this question one must place the interests of the party above all. The personal interests of party members may be taken into account as long as they do not run counter to the interests of the party."

Similarly, but more to the point, a domestic broadcast of 23 March stated:

"The Chinese Communist Party and its members must constantly expose and eliminate their shortcomings and mistakes through criticism and self-criticism. . . it must be carried out in accordance with the party rules, platform, general line and policies which a communist must scrupulously follow in his thinking, utterances and actions. Otherwise it will be against the interests of the party. . . . When criticizing a comrade's ideological mistakes we must adopt the principle of 'unity-criticism-unity.' In other words we must start from the standpoint of unity when we criticize so as to achieve unity on a new basis."

An examination of CCP domestic radio output reveals that "criticism and self-criticism" is applied to a heterogeneous mass of problems including spring planting, proper collection of manure, problems of

block form in the machine tool industry, domestic relations among the cadre, and the arts to name a few. A striking revelation of the depth of the problem is contained in a broadcast of 2 November 1961:

"Some feel that they may offend others should they become cadres." The broadcast notes that after talking to a representative of the CCP chapter who pointed out "that cadres have the complete confidence and trust of the people and that it is a glorious achievement to become a cadre," the wife of a production team leader "revised her attitude and became a cadre....As a result, she not only continues to help her husband in his work, but her own production enthusiasm has also been greatly enhanced...the valuable experience gained by this production brigade should be disseminated in all localities."

Of interest and perhaps indicative of a general line which may emerge from the current National People's Congress being held in Peking ~~SECRET~~ is a People's Daily article of 31 March reporting that drama and opera writers in Canton are being encouraged to "let one hundred flowers bloom and one hundred schools contend." Contrary to press reports this is not the first instance of a revival of "100 Flowers" since the 1956-1957 program. On 28 February 1961, the CCP theoretical journal Red Flag revived the concept by stating that the findings of scientists should be welcomed even if they lack a "Marxist-Leninist viewpoint" and noted that "Marxism-Leninism cannot replace actual study in the various branches of science."

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507. New Light on the 1960 Meeting of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties  
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Background: The Italian Communist Party (PCI) has recently distributed in pamphlet form a "restricted" document containing memoranda and speeches of the Italian delegation to the Conference of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties which took place in Moscow from November to December 1960. Included in this pamphlet are the following: (a) PCI Memorandum to the Commission charged with preparing the Conference; (b) Luigi Longo's first speech in the name of the Italian delegation; (c) Longo's second speech; and (d) a letter from the PCI delegation to Khrushchev.

These documents and speeches are interesting for several reasons. First of all, they are a clear demonstration of the extent to which disagreement and antagonism between the USSR, China, Albania et al. had developed by November 1960. Accusations and counter accusations are rampant. For example, right at the start of Longo's speech we learn that the Italian delegation is opposing a "resolute no" to Chinese attempts to excise from the Declaration the passage that "the decisions of the 20th and 21st CPSU Congresses have had very special meaning for the entire international workers' movement and for all the socialist countries; they are a model of creative development of the revolutionary theory." A few passages further on, we hear about the Chinese position:

"This is why we are so taken aback by the statement of our Chinese comrades, who maintain that the CPSU Central Committee, on a whole range of matters of principle, has drifted away 'in the most obvious manner, from the proper road of Marxism-Leninism, and from the Moscow Declaration, ' /i.e., from the Declaration of 1957/. We hold that this accusation is false and even slanderous, in fact that it is utterly unfounded, and that it transcends the bounds of admissible criticism."

And subsequently,

"We should like to state that it /our disagreement with the Chinese/ turns on issues which have already been thrashed out at considerable length, whose solutions have been accepted by all the parties and have provided the inspiration for basic undertakings in the Soviet Union, orienting the activities of the entire workers' and communist movement. Thus the attack and the criticism made by the Chinese comrades against the CPSU Central Committee and on Comrade Khrushchev himself undermine the value and scope of the policy implemented in recent years by all the parties...."

In his second speech, Longo sums up the case against the Chinese:

"According to our Chinese comrades, almost all the Communist parties, under the influence of the CPSU, have strayed from the spirit and the substance of the 1957 Moscow Declaration, and have surrendered, on a whole series of major issues, to revisionist and opportunistic views. According to them, it is only the Chinese Communist Party that could have corrected this trend, and therefore its action here is useful and necessary. We flatly reject this statement as contrary to fact. The real state of affairs is altogether different. It was the Chinese comrades, with their articles and their positions, which they have developed within international bodies, who brought the Moscow Declaration, the great ideological and political victories that have been achieved on its basis by the individual parties and by the international communist movement as a whole, under discussion again. The Chinese comrades have, by their actions, sown the seeds of doubt, uncertainty, and confusion within the international communist and workers' movement, and have made the tasks of many parties far more difficult by creating the impression that the Communist movement wanted to turn back towards old and outworn dogmatic and sectarian positions.... We regret that the Chinese comrades, in their second speech, showed no signs of wishing to take account of the arguments and the exigencies set forth by the spokesmen for their brother parties. This is the attitude that gives us the most concern for the political unity and the unity of action of the Communist movement."

Regarding the attitude of the Albanians, Longo stated:

"Words fail us for proper denunciation of the Albanian Delegation's attempt to cast doubt in this conference, on the justice of the condemnation of the personality cult and of the errors of Stalin, on the propriety of the effort made in 1955 to woo Yugoslavia back to more correct political positions, and in any case, to improve relations between Yugoslavia and other Socialist countries, on the accuracy of the analysis... of the political causes of the Hungarian counter-revolution and of the events in Poland.... This attempt by the Albanian delegation is beneath contempt...."

The documents are also interesting because, in giving all-out support for Khrushchev's position on such questions as the new "balance of force between capitalism and socialism," "non-inevitability of war," "peaceful coexistence," etc., they provide a detailed exposé of the PCI rationale for the gradualistic methods advocated by the Italian Communists as the correct means for gaining power. For example, Longo, in his first speech, said:

"....it was pointed out by the 20th Congress of the CPSU, and confirmed by the Moscow Declaration of the Communist and Workers' Parties, that it is possible in several countries to achieve a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism.... without any previous insurrection of civil war and without going through any new international

wars. Our Chinese comrades ask us to show them what country is making progress by this means. We answer with firm conviction, that our own PCI has long acted on this belief which best fits the Italian situation. . . . At our last two congresses, we defined exactly what we mean by the democratic struggle, directed at changing the balance of power in parliament and the political leadership of the country, by changing the real relationship between the political and social forces. We must have militant mobilization of the masses in the factories and in the country ranged against the bosses and authorities in all the local and national popular and democratic institutions. . . . We must use these democratic institutions as tools for furthering the real power and effective influence of the working masses; . . . We believe that in the present phase of history, and particularly in certain countries such as Italy, the planning of the struggle for such goals as these is an important and permanent task of a Communist party. . . . Therefore we have based our entire political action on the popular mass struggle to win respect for and implementation of all the political, economic and social reforms called for in the Italian Constitution of the Republic. . . . Our party tries to present itself consistently to the public as a positive political force, one that can find a fair and feasible solution to every problem that arises, and one that is willing to do battle for that solution once it is found."

The letter from the PCI Delegation to Khrushchev shows very clearly how the Italians viewed the compromises that were made in the Declaration in order to get the Chinese (and Albanian) signatures, as well as the interesting attitude of the Italians toward the problem of "Yugoslav revisionism."

"In our opinion it the draft declaration is a step backward on certain issues by comparison with the precision and the clarity of the 1957 Moscow Declaration. . . . Beyond any doubt, this is a result of the need for finding formulations acceptable to all. We understand that this was perhaps inevitable in view of the situation which has arisen; and yet we cannot conceal from you the fact that our party in particular would find itself in serious trouble in carrying out its over-all action if a proper solution were not provided for at least some of the problems covered in the Declaration."

The Italian delegation then stressed the need for an explicit statement in the Declaration in favor of the meaning and permanent validity of its decisions. No retreat was to be permitted on this point. Regarding the question of Yugoslav revisionism, the Italian delegation had prepared a draft amendment which while not straying from the substance of the draft declaration, was "couched in less bitter and offensive terms, such as not to arouse any irremediable break with Yugoslav public opinion. . . . We feel altogether erroneous that one of the basic tasks of the Communist and workers' parties is to 'isolate Yugoslavia from the workers' movement.'"

Finally, that the Italian Communist Party has seen fit to circulate these documents over a year after the Meeting of the 81 Parties took place is in itself of considerable significance. As can be seen readily from the above excerpts, the Italian Communists strongly supported Khrushchev's position against the Chinese. However, they went further than Khrushchev has gone on a number of issues (e. g. gradualism, treatment of the Yugoslavs, and - of course - in the explicit and harsh condemnation of the Chinese). The Italian documents have been replayed in the Polish periodical Polityka in February 1962. It is also interesting to note that the Albanian Party daily Zeri i Popullit of 26 March claimed that the USSR no longer regards the 1960 Moscow Declaration as a viable guide.

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508X1 Finland. The USSR and the West  
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Background: On 30 October 1961, without warning, the USSR invoked a provision of the 1948 Finnish-Soviet Treaty and demanded consultations on measures to ensure the defense of Soviet and Finnish borders against military aggression from West Germany and her allies. The long note charged West Germany with threatening the peace of Europe and attacked Denmark and Norway for associating with West Germany in plans for military adventurism. Shortly thereafter, Ulbricht, Communist boss of East Germany addressed a long letter to President Kekkonen of Finland likewise denouncing West Germany and then arguing for support of a peace treaty with East Germany, the neutralizing of West Germany, resolution of the Berlin crisis along Communist lines, support of peaceful coexistence, etc.

The Finnish government succeeded in avoiding actual military consultation, but continued Soviet pressure, including direct criticism of what the USSR considered anti-Soviet political developments in Finland, resulted in Finland's advancing the date of her parliamentary elections. An atmosphere of precariousness was created in Finland which has since been overcome to a large degree. Finland, however, does not know the USSR's real intentions toward her or when more pressure will be applied in an effort to bind Finland more closely to the Communist camp.

In January, the presidential elections were held, marked by a heavy turnout and resulting in the re-election of President Kekkonen by a considerably enlarged majority. Kekkonen ran without significant opposition, his principal rival, Olavi-Honka representing five opposition parties generally considered pro-Western, having been pressured into withdrawing. The Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL), the local Communist Party, scored no significant gain. Then, in February, the quadrennial parliamentary elections were held, resulting in gains for the non-Communist right and center parties, a loss of twelve delegates (from 14 to 2) of the left-wing Social Democratic League (Skogists) and of three delegates (50-47) of the SKDL. President Kekkonen's Agrarian Party moved from 47 to 53 representatives, thus becoming the largest single party in Parliament. Supported by an enlarged conservative coalition, Kekkonen thus commands a substantial working majority. In an all-time high for Finnish elections, 84.5% of the electorate turned out to vote.

While the results do not clearly indicate an anti-Soviet trend, they do indicate the Communist left at least has not improved its position with the Finnish people. Also, it strengthens Kekkonen's hand in not admitting Communists to the Cabinet. No cabinet has yet been formed, owing to

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
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conflict between the conservatives and employer groups and labor interests over the extent of representation for each group.

Finland's economic prosperity continues, thanks in large part to her trade with the West. Over a year ago, a move was made toward establishing closer economic ties with the European Outer Seven, and at one time it seemed that the USSR was tolerant of the move. At present, however, any move in this direction is quiescent. The USSR has in recent months indicated an interest in increasing her share of trade with Finland. She has also indicated, at least indirectly, that she does not look with favor on any closer ties with the West, viz, her admonitions to Austria along the same lines.

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509. Expose International Communist Delegations and Meetings

Objective: To show how Moscow seeks to spread world communism, with particular attention to local meetings attended by Soviet delegations.

Background: To judge by Communist speeches, the capitalist powers seek to interfere in the internal politics of other countries. Communists claim that communism spreads only because of the "inexorable laws of history," and because of the natural interest in Marxism-Leninism in all parts of the world; that alert workers and peasants everywhere are inspired by admiration for the Soviet example, and spontaneously seek to follow it. As Khrushchev said at the 22nd CPSU Congress, "The Communists are against the export of revolution, and this is well known in the West. But we do not recognize anybody's right to export counter-revolution, to perform the functions of an international gendarme. This too should be well known." And Mikoyan said in January, "We do not export ideology but the ideology of 'socialism' expands by itself, disregarding frontiers." But significantly, Mikoyan was speaking while on a visit to Ghana, where he was busy exporting communism.

Communist ideology is exported in several ways:

a. By communications media, such as radio, periodicals, and books. Radio Moscow broadcasts to all corners of the world in forty languages. In 1961 the Communist Bloc published about 140 periodicals for non-Bloc mass audiences, in 500 separate language editions (an increase of 15 periodicals and 100 language editions over the previous year). In books, the USSR published in 1960, primarily for circulation outside the Bloc, 1,075 titles in 25 languages. The total number of copies for foreign distribution was 40 million in 1960, as compared with 27 million in 1958 and 31 million in 1959.

b. By person-to-person contact, particularly in international meetings and congresses, but also in connection with trade and development activities, student training, and military advisory groups. Soviet scientists seek to influence those of other countries at professional conferences; students are invited to come to the Lumumba Friendship University, where they are trained and indoctrinated, rather than educated; military technicians train the pilots and soldiers of certain underdeveloped countries, either in those countries, or inside the Bloc.

c. By use of local party organizations. This method of spreading ideology is peculiarly Communist, and it is this use of local cadres that lends a certain plausibility to the claim that the Soviet Union does not intervene. Instead of directing Communist activity from a Moscow headquarters, with a large number of Soviet covert political officers in the field and rigid compartmentation between activities, Moscow permits a large degree of local autonomy to non-Bloc CP's. (The problem of control and authority inside

the Communist movement is a large one, which will not be taken up here. Suffice it to note that Communist propaganda and indoctrination is directed, not only at those outside the movement or merely sympathetic to it, but also at those within it.) This procedure has certain advantages: not only does it build a better cover, as already mentioned, but self-reliance also makes for stronger commitment.

d. By use of front organizations. These may be either local or world-wide, like the WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions) and the WPC (World Peace Council). These provide forums for expounding such lines as "Peaceful Coexistence" and anti-colonialism.

The above categories, which often overlap, cover a vast amount of activity. Often it is difficult to "unmask" this activity before the eyes of the public, to show how revolution is being exported. But Communist meetings, and the delegations that attend them, are some of the most obvious exportation activities. An example was provided by the 12th Chilean CP Congress at Santiago last March. Aside from Latin American CP's, the following parties also sent delegates: Bulgaria (Ivan Stenev); Rumania (Gheorghe Vasilichi, Tigu Romulus); East Germany (unidentified); France (Etienne Fajon); Italy (unidentified); and the CPSU (Leonid Nikolaevich Solovyev, Vitaliy Germanovich Korionov, and an interpreter, Igor Rybalkin). Most such delegates are Central Committee members in their parties.

Korionov has specialized in Communist activities directed against the United States and is an assistant department chief in the CPSU Central Committee. He has served on the editorial board of the Soviet journal International Affairs and has written numerous anti-American articles for Pravda. In 1960, he lectured to a Ukrainian seminar group on "The Communist Movement in Capitalist Countries at the Modern Stage"; he has also lectured frequently on anti-US topics under the auspices of the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge. In other words, he is a veteran propagandist, and a specialist in anti-US activity.

Solovyev is a CPSU Central Committee member, and Secretary of the Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions. He is one of the most frequent Soviet travellers abroad, and has led delegations to France (June 1955), China (November 1957), Egypt (January 1958), Helsinki (February 1958), London (March 1959), and Tokyo (August 1959). He was also the leader of this delegation, and he addressed the Chilean Congress, praising Castro as "an intrepid knight of freedom." Solovyev also said that "the imperialist inspirers of the arms race do not retreat voluntarily. They must be forced to retreat."

Solovyev's remarks were relatively tame compared with those of the Cuban delegate, Ramon Calcinés, and those of the leader of the Chilean party itself, Luis Corvalán, who stressed that international Communist solidarity centered today "around the glorious Cuban

revolution... tomorrow it will manifest itself in waves around the inevitable Chilean revolution." Corvalan also stated: "The ruling classes are incapable of resolving the problems of the country, and when the people come to such a conclusion, as is happening now, they will decide to resolve the problem with their own hands and undertake a revolution." It was, he said, necessary to "undertake an anti-imperialist revolution, and give ourselves a government of national liberation." To appreciate who is doing the real exporting, the reader might try to imagine a public anti-government meeting, let us say in Indonesia or Ceylon, where similar counter-revolutionary statements were made, and at which delegates from the United States and other NATO countries attended and also made speeches. Or even more impossible, let him imagine, if he can, such a meeting in a Bloc country.

There seems to be an increase in Soviet participation in and activity at such meetings. The Chilean meeting was the first Soviet-attended CP meeting held in Latin America; it will probably be the first of many. A Soviet delegation also attended the 10th Congress of the Cypriot CP a few weeks before. The Indonesian CP holds its Seventh Congress in late April, and the Danish CP will hold its 21st Congress on 31 May. Soviet direction and support will be manifested at these and other Party and front-group meetings, not only by Soviet participation, but also through the delegates of other Bloc countries, loyal to Moscow's leadership.

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General Disarmament Proposals:

A. Background:

1. The Soviets have presented their disarmament proposals in the form of a draft treaty which differs only superficially from the proposals they advanced in September 1960. Their previous demand for a veto in the international disarmament control organization is now dropped, but they protect themselves against action they deem undesirable by the requirement of a two-thirds majority in the all-member Congress of the control organization, as well as by their veto in the UN Security Council. The Soviet treaty draft mentions "inspection" more frequently than their earlier proposals, but this still means only inspection of the arms which are being destroyed. Soviet propaganda argues that they are the only ones to offer a treaty (this claim has now been undercut by the presentation, on 4 April, of the first part of an American treaty draft); they also argue that their draft provides total disarmament in four years, as well as a total elimination of nuclear delivery systems and a reduction of the forces of the US and the USSR to 1.7 million in the first stage of disarmament. Their draft makes no provision for the transition from one stage to the next.

2. The United States has made four new proposals for the first stage:

a. A 30% cut in nuclear delivery vehicles and major conventional arms within three years.

b. An end to the production of fissionable material, with the United States and the USSR each to turn over 50,000 kilograms of U-235 for peaceful purposes.

c. Measures to prevent war by miscalculation, e.g. advance notification of military movements and of missile firings, such as might be mistaken for an attack.

d. A search for means to make the inspection process less onerous, such as progressive inspection only of small areas in each country, each area being selected by lot ("Sohn Zones").

3. In addition, the United States plan reduces the total armed forces of the USSR and the US to 2.1 million men in the first stage. But the US plan sets no deadline for the completion of disarmament, since it is essential that the early stages be proven to be completed before the later stages are undertaken.

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**B. Discussion:**

1. The Soviet and American plans are really not comparable. The Soviet plan is either (1) an impractical propaganda proposal, not seriously intended, or (2) a means of rapidly disarming the open societies of the world while the disarmament of closed societies remains unverified. (Their plan may also be a combination of (1) and (2)). The US plan is a serious proposal for the disarmament of all under conditions safe for all, with world security ultimately guaranteed by international forces. Suppose either plan was carried out: the Soviet plan would leave the Free World vulnerable due to its inadequate inspection provisions; the US plan would effectively prevent aggression by either "East" or "West." Admittedly the US plan would also require some opening of the closed Soviet society, but this does not mean counter-revolution or the end of socialism.

2. The essential concrete point at issue is inspection and verification. If this cannot be accepted in the mild form proposed by the United States and United Kingdom in their test ban treaty proposals, it seems unlikely that there can be agreement on a complete program of general disarmament.

**Nuclear Test Ban Proposals:**

(These represent a more immediate world concern, since both sides are about to test if no agreement is reached, and also because, as stated above, agreement on general disarmament is hardly likely if agreement on a test ban cannot be reached.)

**A. Background:**

1. Using the US-UK offer of 3 September 1961 for an atmospheric test ban policed by existing detection systems as a pretext, the Soviets proposed on 28 November 1961 that there be a ban on all nuclear tests, policed only by existing detection systems. Thus the Soviets, who had accepted inspection in principle during three years of negotiation, are now ruling it out. The Soviets have offered no concessions during the current test ban talks; on 16 March, Tsarapkin declared again that international inspection was espionage, adding "We will never agree to this."

2. The American and British delegates offer their 18 April 1961 draft treaty, with 19 international control posts on Soviet territory and 12 to 20 annual on-site inspections, depending on the number of seismic disturbances. (The USSR averages several hundred seismic disturbances per year.) As new concessions, the United States offers (1) to drop its previous demand for the exclusion of small underground explosions under 4.75 seismic magnitude (which are most difficult to detect) from the treaty, and (2) to accept a limitation to a small number per year of inspections in areas where seismic disturbances are rare. At the same time, the United States wants protection against preparations for a surprise revival of testing, such as took place during last year's Berlin crisis.

B. Discussion:

Why do the United States and the United Kingdom insist on an inspected test ban agreement?

1. Scientific information still shows that small underground tests can only be verified by on-site inspection. This was recognized in the past by the Soviets themselves. Seismic readings from outside may raise suspensions of testing, but only on-site inspection can prove -- or disprove -- that a nuclear explosion has taken place.
2. If outside readings raise suspicions, and these are not resolved by inspection, fears, disputes and tensions would arise. Signatories to an unpoliced test ban treaty would either have to take assurances on faith or abrogate the treaty and resume testing. Under the US-UK plan, suspicions would be either proven or disproven by on-site inspections conducted under the direction of an impartial international body, and the arms race would be appreciably slowed. (The verification process would, of course, apply to all the signatories, including the United States.)
3. In the light of the events of 1961, the US also desires assurances backed by test site inspection that no preparations are being made for surprise testing which might upset the balance of power, especially in the midst of a political crisis.
4. A test ban treaty constitutes a trial run and a precedent for general disarmament. It is vital for US policy that a precedent be established for inspection.
5. The American administration has gone to the limit in reducing the amount of inspection required. A treaty without inspection would never be approved by Congress. The Soviets are aware of this, and are making propaganda by proposing an unacceptable plan.

Nuclear-Free Zones:

A. Background:

1. The Poles, who have renewed their Rapacki plan proposals, would bar states in a Central European zone (Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and the German Federal Republic) from the production or possession of nuclear warheads or delivery vehicles. Other outside states (the US, USSR, UK, and France) would remove their nuclear weapons and reduce their conventional forces in this area. (Rapacki made his first proposal in 1957; it was renewed on 28 March 1962.)

2. The Swedes proposed last fall a UN resolution (adopted 4 December 1961), inviting non-nuclear states to commit themselves not to make or acquire nuclear weapons, and to

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refuse to receive nuclear weapons on their territory. Although the Swedish proposal is world-wide in intent, it is significant mainly for Central Europe. While the Swedish initiative may be partly attributable to an internal controversy as to whether Sweden should possess nuclear weapons, the Swedish proposal is symptomatic of the vulnerability of some intelligent neutrals to Rapacki's plausible concept.

B. Discussion:

The United States also opposes the spread of nuclear weapons to "Nth" powers, and does not intend to transfer the control of nuclear arms to non-nuclear states (although it wishes to keep open the possibility of establishing a multilateral NATO nuclear deterrent force). The United States considers the questions of nuclear-free zones (as in Africa) up to the powers concerned, and it has in fact agreed to a nuclear free Antarctic. But Central Europe is not an appropriate area for such a zone, and the United States opposes the Rapacki plan for the following reasons:

1. The result would be a relative strategic gain for the Soviets. The plan would not disarm nuclear weapons based on close by Soviet territory which are able to strike Central and Western Europe. Also, Allied forces in Germany, including the Bundeswehr, would be crippled if they were denied the support of nuclear weapons for responding to a large-scale attack by large numbers of Soviet divisions. Under the Rapacki plan, the Bundeswehr would also lose conventional strength; it now helps to balance the tremendous Soviet forces.
2. In consequence, NATO would be weaker and less united. Allies of the United States oppose this plan, and if the United States accepted it, doubts would be raised as to the firmness of the American commitment to defend Europe.
3. The real target of the Rapacki Plan is the tie between the Federal Republic and the West. Despite many appeals to anti-German sentiment, the Soviets dream of inaugurating a new Rapallo policy with West Germany; this was shown by their feelers last winter. If the West Germans lose confidence in NATO's willingness and ability to defend the German area, the temptation for Bonn to seek ties with Moscow could be well-nigh irresistible.